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Summary findings
In the late 1980s, Chile planned to privatize Santiago's  *  Chile has a long tradition of private water rights,
sanitary works enterprise  (EMOS) but instead reformed  shaped by early recognition that water is a scarce
it under public ownership. It did so through a regulatory  and tradable private good.
framework that mimicked the design of a concession  *  The reformed regulatory framework was designed to
with a private utility, setting tariffs that ensured at least a  attract private investors to the water system and to
7 percent return on assets, creating a neutral regulator  motivate them to operate  efficiently and expand the
independent of ministry intervention, and giving EMOS  system.
the right to appeal the regulator's tariff decisions.  *  Chile's unique electoral institutions sustained this
This reform  of Santiago's  water  system is often  framework under state operation  after democracy
cited  as a case of successful reform  under  public  was restored.
management.  Comparing  a comprehensive  measure  of  * Chile's strong bureaucratic norms and institutions,
welfare  with a counterfactual  example,  Shirley, Xu,  (permitting little corruption),  comnbined  with
and Zuluaga  show surprisingly  large gains from  Santiago's relatively low-cost water system,
Santiago's  reform,  given the relatively good  initial  permitted  prices that effectively increased quasi-
conditions.  (The gains accrued  largely to government  rents for investing in the system while minimizing
and  employees,  but consumers  benefited  from  the risk of inefficiency or monopoly rents.
improved  service and  coverage.)  The authors also address the question of why EMOS
Why did reform in Santiago improve water system  was reformed but not privatized, and what the costs of
performance, when similar reform attempts under public  not privatizing were. The system was privatized in 1999,
management in other countries failed?  but the changes from privatization are likely to be less
significant than those introduced in 1989-90.
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REFORMING URBAN WATER SUPPLY: THE CASE OF SANTIAGO, CHILE
In the late 1980's Chile intended to privatize the Santiago Metropolitan Sanitary Works
Enterprise (Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias, or EMOS).  Instead it was ultimately
reformed under public ownership, by means of a regulatory framework that mimicked the design
of a concession with a private utility. (Table 1 lists the reform components.) In particular, the
new regulation set tariffs so as to assure at least a 7 percent return on assets, created a neutral
regulator independent of ministry intervention, and gave EMOS the right to appeal the
regulator's tariff decisions. As we shall see, the changes allowed significant price increases,
which helped fund improved maintenance and enabled  EMOS to expand as Santiago's
population grew.  The reform produced net benefits in economic welfare that are surprisingly
large given the relatively good initial conditions. These gains largely accrued to government,
although consumers benefited from almost 1  00 percent coverage of expanding demand, better
water pressure and fewer interruptions of service. Consumers also had to pay higher prices, but
the effects were ameliorated by a direct subsidy. Employees gained from wages closer to market
wages.  By reducing information asymmetries, increasing managerial incentives and signaling
commitment, the reform fostered important efficiency gains in EMOS.  Privatization ultimately
occurred in 1999, and the changes it may induce are likely to be of less significance than those
introduced in 1989-90, which are the subject of this paper.6
Table 1. Principal  Components  of the Reform
1.  Tariffs:
Old:
Ad hoc  increases  set  by  the  Ministry  of  Economy  (issued  as  Presidential
decrees)  within  a ceiling  (no  more  than  10  percent  return  on  fixed  assets).
New:
Tariffs  indexed  to  inflation  and  adjusted  every  five years  according  to  a formula
based  on  marginal  costs. New  tariff  formula  introduced  gradually  from  1990  to
1995  starting  with  a 30  percent  real  increase  in 1990.
2.  Subsidies:
Old:
Cross  subsidies  for smaller  amounts  of consumption  (first  ten  cubic  meters  of
consumption  had  lower  tariffs).
New:
Direct  subsidy  paid  to the  company  by  the  municipality  from  federal  budget  for all
customers  within  a low-income  category  since  1990.  Covered  an  average  of 60
percent  of  first 15  (later  20)  cubic  meters  of consumption  per  month.
3.  Regulator:
Old:
National  Service  of Sanitary  Works  (SENDOS),  an  autonomous  public  entity
attached  to the  Ministry  of Public  Works,  directly  managed  11  of the  country's  13
regional  water  offices.  EMOS  was  autonomous.
New:
Superintendent  of  Sanitary  Services,  a regulatory  body  attached  to  the  Ministry
of Public  Works,  responsible  for  setting  tariffs,  setting  and  enforcing  technical
standards,  and  granting  concessions  for water  supply  and  sewerage  services
since  1990.
4.  Company  Status:
Old:
Autonomous  entity  under  public  law.
New:
State-owned  corporation  under  private  commercial  law  since  1988.7
Many observers regard Santiago's water system reform as an important example of
successful reform under public management. This report addresses the central question of why
this reform improved performance, when similar attempts to reform under public ownership have
met with failure in other countries. It also addresses the question of why EMOS was not
privatized, but was reformed, and what were the costs, if any, of not privatizing. To answer these
questions we analyze how institutions, in the broad sense of rules and norms delimitating and
guiding human behavior and social interactions, influence choice and economic performance
(North 1990). We examine the gains from reform comprehensively, including consumer surplus
and effects on labor, buyers and government compared to a counterfactual.
As we shall show, political circumstances led to a regulatory framework designed to
attract private investors to the water system, and motivate them to operate efficiently and expand
the system.  Chile's unique electoral institutions sustained this framework under state operation
after democracy was restored.  Chile's bureaucratic institutions and norms, combined with
Santiago's relatively low cost water system, allowed it to implement prices that in effect
increased quasi-rents for investment in the system, while minimizing the risk of inefficiency or
monopoly rents.  The regulation was enshrined in detailed legislation backed by constitutional
safeguards.  Since political institutions make it hard to change laws in Chile, this legal
foundation had strong credibility.  The lack of regulatory discretion also protected the regulator
from politically motivated intervention, while a direct consumer subsidy reduced political
incentives to press for lower tariffs.
The next section describes the circumstances that made reform politically desirable and
feasible despite relatively good initial conditions in the water system, and explains why EMOS
was not privatized but was reformed under public ownership. Section II analyzes the8
characteristics of the reform in terms of an implicit "regulatory contract" supported by
fundamental bureaucratic and judicial institutions.  This section assessing how the contract
addressed agency problems by improving information, raising incentives and signaling
commitment.  The following section (Section III) measures the effect of the reform on economic
welfare and other performance measures and shows that the gains were relatively large despite
good initial conditions.  Finally, section IV concludes with a discussion of the implications of
our findings.
I.  The Decision to Reform
We might assume that governments would seek water reform where there is a pressing
need to expand coverage of unmet demand, improve the operation of a poorly run company, or
reduce a fiscal drain.  The slow pace of reform in cities where the water system has been in crisis
for years, however, suggests that serious sector problems alone are not what motivates water
reforms.'  Rather, we expect that reform occurs when a macro-economic crisis shifts political
circumstances so that reform becomes politically desirable, in the sense that the political benefits
outweigh the political costs, and politically feasible, in the sense that those favoring reform can
win control of the veto gates and overcome opposition.
For example, planned reforms were not implemented in Lima in the 1990's even though at least a quarter of the
population was not connected and those with connections had no water for 15 hours a day on average. In Mexico
City, depletion of the aquifer has been causing the city to sink yet low tariffs and deficient bill collection
encouraged high levels of water consumption until recently.  See Alcazar and Xu 1998 on Lima and Brook-Cowan
and Haggarty 1998 on Mexico City.9
Under many circumstances the political costs of water system reform are likely to be
high.  One reason for this is that reform often reverses a long history of underpricing of water
services. Water systems have low variable costs compared to their fixed costs, which means that
a large part of a cost recovery tariff would take the form of quasi-rents. Since capital
investments in water are very durable, a water company may be able to operate for years without
recovering its fixed costs (Noll, Shirley and Cowan 1999). As a result many governments,
including Chile's, have chosen to keep water tariffs low for long periods, sometimes for so long
that the company begins to under-invest in maintenance as well as expansion. Political costs of
water reform may also be large in cases where water has high political saliency.  Some countries,
such as Mexico, have laws or constitutional prohibitions against cutting off consumers who fail
to pay their water bills. Another reason why the political costs of water reform may outweigh the
benefits is that the beneficiaries of water reforms tend to be poor, recent migrants and the
opponents tend to be wealthier, better organized workers and consumers who are already
connected. For all these reasons we expect that water reform follows a crisis that changes the net
political benefits from reform.
The rest of this section describes the relatively good conditions in the water system in
Santiago, explains how the political equation changed in Santiago to make reform politically
desirable and feasible, and discusses the political circumstances that led to the unusual reform
that resulted.
A.  Circumstances in the Water Sector Leading to Reform
Absent politics, the circumstances in the water sector that we expect would be likely to
provoke reform are: (i) water shortages (ii) large unmet demand, (ii) deficient management; and10
(iv) financial problems.  As we show below, none of these problems except finances were
especially serious in EMOS' case. Initial conditions in Santiago's water sector were relatively
good: raw water was cheap and abundant, demand for water and sewerage was largely met, and
the company was reasonably well managed. EMOS' main problems were due to a lack of funds
for maintenance and expansion.
(i) Water Shortages. At the time of the 1990 reform there were no unpredictable shortfalls
that might motivate consumer dissatisfaction, nor was there a need for costly new investments to
expand supply in the near term.  EMOS' main source of water was relatively abundant, good
quality and cheap surface water from the Maipo River, supplemented by a lake and 90 deep
wells. The system was sustainable, in the sense that EMOS own water sources were sufficient to
meet Santiago's projected demand for the next 10 to 20 years (World Bank project documents). 2
Supply is also sufficient even during low periods, although reliance on snow melt during summer
has led to some variability (field interviews with engineering faculty members, University of
Chile).  Furthermore, alternative sources are available, although expensive. 3
(ii) Demand  Unmet demand for water or sewerage was not a motivating factor for
reform.  Since 1980, about 98 percent of EMOS' potential clients had water connections, and
2  Supply  in 1997  was considered  sufficient  to cover current  average  consumption  until 2005 (field  interviews  with
Superintendencia  staff). Note that all field interviews  took  place in 1997.
3  Water  rights  are tradeable  but costly. Water  rights  are almost  entirely  allocated  to private  parties. The water
market  functions  poorly,  with  few  transactions  and high  transaction  costs,  in part because  of the high cost  of
physically  changing  canal flows and in  part because  much of the water  rights are not legally  inscribed  but are
exercised  on the basis of traditional  holdings  (Chile  has allowed  private  water  rights since  the 1920's).  EMOS
purchased  33 shares  (a share is equivalent  to at least 22 liter/second  85 percent  of the time) between  1990-93  at an
average  cost of US$10,000  per share. This is a small  purchase,  as evidenced  by the fact  that EMOS  owns 1,369
shares  of the Rio Maipo  water,  while total  shares  are 8,133.  There  have  been  too few  transactions  to know how
typical  this purchase  price would  be. Herme  and Easter  1995  and Rios  and Quiroz, 1995.41
90 percent had sewerage connections (see Table 2).4 These data overstate coverage somewhat
since clients in EMOS' definition did not include households in informal settlements that had
been built without networks nor did it incorporate several poor communities just outside its
concession boundary. 5 The population without connections to the piped water system in
Santiago were overwhelmingly poor. Most lived in informal settlements built without a
secondary network and would probably not have been able to finance the cost of connecting,
which could reach more than US$1,000 (field interviews). The Pinochet administration's
program to eliminate illegal settlements and rental tenements in the city center added to the
number of unconnected consumers, by leading many poor people to relocate to the far south of
Santiago in areas with little existing infrastructure (Gilbert, 1993). These unconnected citizens
had little political influence, as we explain below.
Demand for sewage treatment was low at the time of the reform, even though only about
1 percent of wastewater was being treated (raised to 3 percent in 1995). Santiago had higher
rates of water born disease than in the rest of the country because food crops were irrigated with
contaminated water, but consumers had little information about the health risks. 6 More recently,
with the outbreak of cholera in Peru in 1993 and the rising economic importance of Chile's
4  These  numbers  overstate  coverage  somewhat  because  the indigent  population  without  legal  housing  (about  5
percent  of the city's population)  are excluded.
'  The legal responsibility  for building  housing  connections  and  networks  ready  for hookup  to EMOS'
infrastructure  lay with the developer,  or in  the case of poor, informal  settlements,  with  the local government.
Santiago's  40 odd municipalities  lacked  the funds  to build  networks  or housing  connections.
6  Polluted  wastewater  was used  to irrigate  130,00  ha, including  7,000  ha used for growing  raw  vegetable  crops  for
immediate  consumption  in  the metropolitan  region. Santiago  averaged  150  cases of typhoid  per 100,000  a year
from 1985  to 1991  (compared  to a rate of 50 cases  per 100,000  for all of Chile)  and epidemiological  analysis
suggests  that  the higher  rate of endemic  typhoid  in Santiago  was causally  linked  to irrigating  vegetables  with
polluted  water (World  Bank 1994).12
agricultural exports, concerns over the health and economic effects of irrigating food crops with
untreated wastewater have increased. 7
Table 2. Coverage of Water and Service
Year  Client  % with Water  % with Sewerage
Population (000)  Connection  Connection
1980  3,597  98.6  85.0
1981  3,675  97.8  83.9
1982  3,750  98.5  84.6
1983  3,860  98.6  84.6
1984  3,926  98.6  87.0
1985  4,049  99.0  87.3
1986  4,287  99.0  88.1
1987  4,250  99.2  90.0
1988  4,422  99.2  90.3
1989  4,593  99.2  90.5
1990  4,816  98.0  90.3
Source: EMOS, Statistical Bulletin, various.
(iii) Management. Mismanagement is often a motivation for reform, but this was not a
significant problem in Santiago. In 1990, at the time of the reform, EMOS served a water and
sewerage concession area that covered most of the Santiago metropolitan region, with water
connections to some 4.7 million people. 8 EMOS was regarded as efficiently managed and
performing well in comparison with other water companies in the region (World Bank 1992,
p. 34).9 Connections were almost entirely metered, and bill collection rates were over 80 percent,
high by regional standards.  Unaccounted-for-water or UFW was high at 31 percent of total water
7  The Santiago metropolitan region produces about 40 percent of Chile's exportable fruit (fruit represents about 85
percent of agricultural exports for human consumption). (World Bank 1994).
8  The population in EMOS' concession area at that time represented 87 percent of the population of Santiago; the
rest of the city was served by a small municipal and a private water company. The private company, Lo Castillo
(later Aguas Cordillera), operated in a largely high income neighborhood with about 5 percent of the population of
Santiago.  It had been set up by the developer and allowed to remain in private hands. The municipal company,
Maipu, is in a middle to low income area of Santiago and served about 7% of the metropolitan population (See
Table 6 of the statistical appendix).
9  EMOS was created in 1977 as an autonomous decentralized government company.13
produced in 1989, but this rate was down from 38 percent in 1987.10  Furthermore, according to
World Bank 1992, high UFW was not the result of mismanagement but of failure by the Ministry
of Finance to permit EMOS sufficient investment funds to maintain its system, something we
discuss in the next section.
Overstaffing was not a problem thanks to a 1977 effort by the Pinochet government to
reduce the size of the public sector and expand competitive procurement from private provider
through outsourcing. By contracting out such activities as meter distribution, reading and repair,
network maintenance, and transport, EMOS reduced its staff from 3,200 workers in 1977 to
1,700 by December 1989, or from an average of 2.4 staff per 1000 water connections in the early
eighties to 2.1 in 1990."
(iv) Financial Problems. Finance was the one area where EMOS had serious problems.
The company ran a loss before taxes from the early 1980's until 1987, largely because its tariffs
were not allowed to increase in real terms. Tariffs during this period were substantially below
World Bank estimates of EMOS' long run marginal costs (World Bank, 1992, p. 33).12 EMOS'
rate of return on total assets in 1989 was only 2.7 percent, which was still better than the average
return of all Chile's public water companies at that time: negative 1.6 percent (Table 3).
'°  Defined as the difference between the volume of water produced and the volume billed (i.e. the losses due to
leaks, metering inefficiencies, theft, and the like).  In 1984 unaccounted-for-water averaged 12 percent in the US
and 15 percent in Canada  (Brooke-Cowen, Dianderas, and Yepes, 1996).
I'  Some observers suggested that EMOS might have been understaffed in certain skills as a result of these
reductions (World Bank, 1986 and field interviews).
12  The World Bank estimated long run marginal costs of EMOS' 1982 to 1985 water and sewerage investment
program (at a discount rate of 11 percent) at 25.7 US cents/M3. In comparison, its actual tariff rate for water and
sewerage of 10.5 US cents/M3 in 1987 and 11.5 in 1988 (ibid, p. 53).14
EMOS'  low cash flow, combined with borrowing constraints imposed by the Ministry of Finance
to keep the debt of state owned enterprises low, explain why the company under-invested in
maintenance and expansion.  Some of EMOS' facilities were old and much in need of repair and
replacement by 1990. For example it had collection and treatment works dating to 1917 and
20% of its network of pipes exceeded their usable life of 30 years (Raquel Alfaro 1987). This
contributed to 52 pipe breaks per 100 Kms in 1989, compared to a US average of 17. The World
Bank estimated in 1986 that EMOS would need to invest US$ 118.6 million from 1987-1989 to
meet projected demand and maintenance needs; but its actual investment for that period was only
$24 million (all figures in constant 1989 dollars).' 3 Although service was still reasonably good,
without additional funds the company would not be able to keep water pressure up, avoid even
more frequent service interruptions and expand the system to keep up with population growth
(field interviews).
13  World Bank 1986b.  These projection investment requirements are probably an overestimate since they were
based on demand estimates that assumed a lower price than actually was charged (a 9 percent real increase in 1987,
6 percent in 1988, and 9 percent in 1989, compared to actual real increases of 17 percent in 1987 and 10 percent in
1988 and 1989.  Nevertheless, most observers agree that EMOS was seriously underinvesting in maintenance and
expansion during this period.15
Table 3. Rate of Return on Assets of Water Companies
(% after  tax profits/total  assets)
EMOS  TOTAL  PRIVATE  ALL
STATE  &  WATER
ENTERPRISES  MUNICIPAL  COMPANIES
1988  3.6  -1.4  -0.1  -1.4
1989  2.7  -1.6  13.4  -0.8
1990  4.8  -1.1  3.9  -0.8
1991  6.6  -0.2  1.6  -0.1
1992  8.4  0.9  4.0  -0.9
1993  9.7  3.4  - 6.5  3.6
1994  11.5  5.1  7.2  5.2
1995  11.0  5.9  10.0  6.3
Source:  SSS, 1995.
B.  Political Circunmtances Leading to Reform
(i) Crisis. As mentioned, we expect reform is more likely to occur after a crisis alters the
political costs and benefits to the decision-makers. The crisis which played this role in Chile was
the hyperinflation and shortage of goods followed by the 1973 military coup, which overthrew
the elected Socialist President Salvador Allende and brought to power the dictatorship of Army
General Agusto Pinochet.  The Pinochet government's ideology was based on free market
principles and advocated small and efficient government; early in its tenure the Pinochet
administration decided to sell EMOS. 14
(ii) Political Costs and Benefits. Although the government was committed to privatize
EMOS, it was not a particularly important component of the government's privatization
program, which explains the long delay in moving forward.  As we have seen, most of the usual
14  In keeping  with these  principles  the administration  removed  all quantitative  restrictions  on trade and reduced
tariffs  to 10 percent  across  the board; privatized  virtually  all state  owned finance  and  manufacturing  enterprises  and
much  public  infrastructure;  and replaced  a public  pay-as-you-go  social  security  system  with  one  based on private
pension  funds. It also  eliminated  most subsides  and  transfers  and required  profitable  SOEs  to pay dividends,  while,
as we have  seen, pushing  public  agencies  to reduce  their in-house  staff  and  procure  services  competitively.16
motivations for change were absent or weak in Santiago's water system.  Moreover, many of the
main beneficiaries of reform were not important constituencies of the Pinochet government.
The main potential beneficiaries of a water reform are: (i) users who would otherwise not
be connected, (ii) those already connected consumers who value the benefits from improvements
in service quality more than the cost from higher prices, and (iii) private investors who benefit
from the expansion in construction of water infrastructure or the opportunity to operate the firm.
In the case of Santiago, the first two groups of beneficiaries were not a powerful force for reform.
Their interests did not coincide: EMOS' existing customers could expect to see their water bills
increase if EMOS expanded more rapidly. This reduced their motivation to organize and jointly
pressure for reform. More importantly, even if they had organized they would not have had a
sympathetic hearing, since neither new nor existing EMOS customers were important supporters
of the Pinochet administration. The military government's strongest support in general was rural
and upper income (Mendez 1990). Santiago in particular was not an important source of support
throughout Pinochet's tenure.  Evidence for this can be found in the city's voting record. The
metropolitan area had the second highest vote of any region in the country against Pinochet's
new constitution in the 1980 plebiscite -- 36 percent voted no compared to 30 percent nationwide
(El Mercurio September 12, 1980). The city also had the second highest vote against the
continuation of the Pinochet regime in the 1988 plebiscite-- 58 percent of Santiago voted against
Pinochet versus 53 percent in the rest of the country (El Mercurio October 7, 1988).
Although Santiago was not a constituency of Pinochet's supporters, the government had
an interest in national water reform and in the sale of EMOS.  Other Chilean water companies
were performing much worse than EMOS and operated in cities where the government had more17
supporters.  Hence there was an interest in improving their regulation, and since water is
regulated nationally any change would also affect EMOS.
Furthermore, the administration had one constituency group in Santiago that wanted
reform in the 1980's.  If EMOS had more capital to invest, contractors and developers would
benefit from more contracts with EMOS as well as from expanded real estate development.  The
municipal area had been reduced from 100,000 hectares to 60,000 in the mid-1980's to control
sprawl which meant that most new development in Santiago took the form of greater density
within the EMOS concession area, rather than movement into areas where rival water companies
might operate.  This restriction combined with advances in anti-seismic construction fostered a
surge of high rise development in Santiago in the mid 1980's.  Because of EMOS' deteriorating
financial situation, these contractors were not confident that it could expand its infrastructure fast
enough to meet demand or maintain enough pressure to accommodate new development (field
interviews). The developers and construction contractors were part of the constituent base of the
Pinochet government.'5 Developers and contractors strongly supported EMOS' privatization and
help draft the water legislation in the late 1980's (interviews with members of Chilean Chamber
of Construction).
The major opposition to reform came from EMOS' workers.  Although layoffs due to
outsourcing had occurred under public ownership, EMOS' workers believed they still had much
to fear from privatization. Firing state enterprise workers was difficult, so previous reductions in
15  Weyland 1997 cites the strong support of the leading confederation of businessman (CPC, the Confederation of
Manufacturing and Trade) for the military government's economic program throughout the administration.18
the 1970's, had been voluntary, through early retirement and agreements with private contractors
to hire EMOS staff whose job was outsourced." 6 EMOS' workers feared outright dismissals
under a private owner (interviews with union officials).  Moreover, even if they could retain their
jobs, EMOS'  workers expected that privatization would reduce their job security.' 7
Worker opposition to the reform was not a deterrent, however.  EMOS workers were not
part of the Pinochet government's constituency. Trade unions in general had been vocal
opponents of the administration from the outset, and most of EMOS workers had opposed the
regime according to field interviews with union leaders." 8 Moreover, in other privatizations the
Pinochet government had overcome opposition from workers who might otherwise have engaged
in disruptive strikes or demonstrations, such as those in ports, electricity or telecommunications,
through a combination of compulsion and compensation (World Banki 1995).19
C.  Why Was EMOS Not Privatized but Reformed?
In this section we first explain the political circumstances that delayed and ultimately
stopped the intended sale of EMOS in 1989. We then discuss how political changes combined
1  EMOS' ordinary retirement package was one month for each year of service; workers asked to retire were given
two months (field interviews).  Activities which might still be outsourced included bill collection, engineering and
the company kitchen.
"  Field interviews. Line workers represent approximately 60 percent of EMOS' staff and have their own unions.
(EMOS has three unions; one for operators and other line workers, one for clerical staff and one for professional
and technical staff.  Almost 100 percent of eligible staff are unionized.)  EMOS has had low turnover except for the
outsourcing.
Is  Weyland 1997 argues that workers in general were strong opponents of the Pinochet government because it had
limited trade union rights.  Also, according to surveys before the election of 1989,  the Pinochet administration had
strong support from upper income groups (Mendez 1990) and business associations (Weyland 1997).
'9  The usual compensation was the chance to buy 10 percent of the shares at the offer price by borrowing on
workers'  severance pay.19
with Chile's electoral and political institutions led the government to privatize the water
regulation without privatizing ownership of the assets of Santiago's state-owned water company.
(i) Why Was EMOS Not Privatized?  The sale of water assets had low political saliency
for the Pinochet administration and for that reason it moved more slowly to privatize EMOS than
other utilities. One reason for low saliency was the relatively minor water problems in Santiago
combined with the relatively small proportion of beneficiaries who were constituents of the
regime.  Hence, there was little push for rapid change. A second cause was financial:
privatization in other sectors would bring much higher revenues than in water.  EMOS was one
of the few water companies that would command a good price and in 1991 the sales value of
EMOS was estimated at about US$150 million. In contrast the four telecommunications
transactions raised over $540 million and three of the 14 electricity transactions generated
US$220 million.  Thus, in the 1970's and most of the 1980's, the administration focused on
other, more pressing sectors.
In addition, the leadership believed that they had a longer window of opportunity to
privatize water than they ultimately had. Although a plebiscite on the continuation of the regime
was scheduled for 1988, General Pinochet was convinced that he would win this vote and stay in
power until 1997 (Constable and Valenzuela 1990).2Q  For all these reasons, new water legislation
was only enacted in 1988-90, after all of industry and much of telecommunications and
electricity had been privatized.
20  Constable and Valenzuela 1990 firther  argue the General regarded the polls suggesting his defeat as biased and
ignored them.20
The defeat of General Pinochet in the October 1988 plebiscite left the regime with little
time to pass all the planned water legislation and sell EMOS before national elections were due
to be held on December 14, 1989.2'  The government was already in negotiations with a Spanish
buyer for EMOS and could conceivably had gone ahead and sold the company before the
elections. The privatization of EMOS should have attracted private investors willing to pay a
good price.  Private investors had viewed the country as a relatively good risk according to
Chile's scores in investor risk ratings in the second half of the 1980'  S.22  In addition, institutions
to protect private property in water were in place, as evidenced by Chile's historical tradition of
private water rights, the fact that a private water company was already operating in Santiago, the
successful privatization of other infrastructure, and the constitutional protections against
expropriation. Moreover, Chile's constitution and electoral rules described below would have
made it very difficult for a new regime to reverse privatization, or repeal or rewrite the water
legislation.
Against these protections, however, potential buyers would weigh pre-electoral
uncertainty that might have led them to deeply discount their bids.  National polls as early as
March 1989 suggested that the military backed candidate, Heman Biichi, was not a sure winner
of the plebiscite (Table 4). Private investors voiced fears that if the opposition won they would
drastically increase expenditures and accelerate inflation (Weyland 1997). There were also
concerns that the military might intervene if their candidate lost (Constable and Valenzuela
21  Ninety percent of eligible voters participated in the plebiscite and 55 percent voted against the continuation of
the Pinochet regime (El Mercurio, October 7, 1988).
22  Chile's ICRG score, which gives a value to private sector assessments of firm risk, averaged 16.8 from 1985-89,21
1989). To privatize EMOS at a deep discount right before the elections was politically risky since
the firm was widely regarded as a company that should command a high price (field interviews).
The administration feared it could harm public support for the military backed candidate (field
interviews).
Table 4. Polling Results before the December 1989 Presidential Elections
March  October  December
Attractive Personality:
Buchi  37.6  30.2  20.5
Aylwin  31.9  36.6  44.5
Inspires Confidence:
Bulchi  35.8  30.7  23.1
Aylwin  36.0  44.1  52.2
Source: Mendez 1990.
Another explanation for why the Pinochet administration did not sell EMOS before the
elections was worker opposition. As we discussed, worker opposition would not normally have
been a barrier to privatization.  In this case, however, the unions' threat of an illegal national
strike of water workers raised the political risks of selling EMOS so close to the election.  Water
union leaders were able to convince two members of the Chilean military junta that privatization
of water in 1989 would be a mistake.  23
In the event, the Pinochet government decided not to sell EMOS until after the election.
This proved to be too late.  The opposition candidate, Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat who
headed a 17 party coalition (Partidos Concertados por la Democracia, or Concertaci6n) won a
compared to 15 for Mexico and 16.8 for Korea during the same period (p. 208, World Bank 1995).
23  According to field interviews, the representatives of the Navy and police force opposed water privatization after
meeting with EMOS' workers and swayed the rest of the junta.22
decisive victory over the candidate supported by the military, Hernan Buichi  (Uni6n por el
Progreso, or UPP), and the new government took office on March 11, 1990.24
The Aylwin government faced a different political equation: the political cost from
selling EMOS did not outweigh the political benefits.  The first cost was ideological: President
Aylwin's stated view before the elections was that state enterprises which provide basic services
should "stay in public hands" (Gonzalez Parra, 1990, p. 36). His party's position had been that
any privatizations after the 1988 plebiscite should be reversed (EIU, December 1, 1989) and
sales of all SOEs came to a virtual halt after he took power (EIU, January 1, 1993). A second
cost was that the opponents of privatization of water were important constituents of the Aylwin
administration.  Besides the workers in EMOS and other state-owned water companies, the sale
was opposed by members of the winning coalition who now headed regional and local
governments and wanted to appoint their supporters to posts in the water companies. 25 Third, the
main supporters of a sale, the building and construction industry, were not constituents of the
new regime.
(ii) Why Was EMOS Reformed? A central question in this case is why Chile introduced a
reform designed for a privatized company under state ownership despite the election of a
government that opposed EMOS' privatization. The new regulation would have been very
difficult to reverse because of Chile's unusual political institutions, as cogently described by
Baldez and Cary 1997. The Chilean constitution, which was written by the Pinochet government
24  Aylwin got 53.8 percent of the popular vote; Buchi got 28.7; and a centrist Independent candidate (Errazuriz)
got 15 percent.
25  The sale of one water company was (and is) widely regarded as the precursor to the sale of the remaining23
and ratified in a plebiscite in 1987, is an example of deck stacking as defined in McCubbins, Noll
and Weingast, 1987, 1989. It ensured that the preferences of Pinochet's constituents were likely
to prevail even after the military regime had lost power. The constitution required an absolute
majority in Congress to change laws, and at the same time made it almost impossible for a new
opposition regime to control such a majority (see Baldez and Carey, 1997). Reversal was
difficult first because of the  "designated non-elected Senators", of which four were appointed by
the Military Junta, three by the Supreme Court, and two by the President, while the rest were ex-
Presidents who had served six years.  Since in 1990 most of these senators were appointees of
the Pinochet government, they would have opposed changes to the water legislation. 26 A second
factor making reversal hard was an electoral system with two member districts that gave
preference to the top candidates on whatever two of the different party lists received the most
votes.  This system encouraged parties to form coalitions and split most districts' votes between
the two coalitions that represented the left and the right. 27 By "systematically over-representing
the parties of the right," the electoral system made it unlikely that a left-leaning government such
as Aylwin's could win enough seats to change existing legislation (Ibid p. 188).
companies  according  to field  interviews.
26  Pinochet  replaced  many of the Supreme  Court  justices  before  leaving  office  with  younger  men. Supreme  Court
justices serve  until they are 75 (except  the president  of the court,  who serves  for life), although  the President  can
remove  them  "for bad conduct"  with  the Court's agreement.  Republic  of Chile,  Constitution,  1980.
27  Baldez  and Cary, 1997. Briefly,  each  district  elects  two  members  of congress  from lists of two candidates
presented  by the parties  or coalitions. The  total  votes for  both candidates  on each  party's list  are totaled  first and the
first  seat is awarded  to the more  preferred  candidate  from the list  with  the most votes. Votes  for that list are then
divided  by two and if the quotient  is higher  than any other  list's total  votes,  the second  candidate  gets  the second
seat;  otherwise  the seat goes to the first  candidate  on the list  with  the next highest  total votes. As the authors  note,
this system  assures  that  the candidates  of the top two  coalitions  will each  get a seat unlesss  the top coalition's  list
gets  more  than double  the vote of the second  place coalition's  list. Parties  which  are not part of the two largest
coalitions  are virtually  disenfranchised.24
Thus, even though Aylwin's coalition, Concertaci6n, won a majority in the lower
chamber of Congress in the 1989 elections, the distribution of seats meant that it could not
overturn  the water  legislation  without the  -- highly unlikely  -- agreement  of some  of the
opposition or appointed senators (Table 5).
Table 5. Distribution of Congressional Seats, 1989
Coalition  Chamber of Deputies  Senate
Concertaci6n  58%  47%
UPP  40%  33%
Independents  2%
Appointed Senators  19%
Source: Baldez and Carey, 1997
Even if the new government couldn't reverse the reform, it could have dragged its feet in
implementing it.  Instead Aylwin chose to implement the changes expeditiously and vigorously.
The reform was politically desirable because the political costs were low. The workers opposed
reform under public ownership because they feared it would lay the groundwork for future
privatization, but this opposition was mild compared to their views about privatization (field
interviews with unions). 28 Workers would receive compensation for going along with the reform,
since they could keep their protections as public workers yet collectively bargain.  Moreover, the
workers were not veto players because they could not credibly threaten to leave the coalition over
something as mild as the water reform (Cox and McCubbins 1997).
28  Bureaucrats responsible for supervising EMOS and the other water companies were also opposed to the creation
of a new regulatory structure that would cost them jobs and power, but they were probably not an important
constituency of the new government.  Their fears were well founded.  EMOS and the other water companies were
supervised by the National Sanitary Works Service (SENDOS, Servicio Nacional de Obras Sanitarias) of the
Ministry of Public Works.  With reform, supervision was transferred to the state enterprise holding company
(CORFO), while the new Superintendence for Sanitary Services took over the regulatory function. Most of the 200
bureaucrats in SENDOS were no longer needed and were offered early retirement or other, less desirable, jobs (field
interviews).25
Another reason why net political benefits were positive was that the main beneficiaries,
the urban poor, were an important part of the coalition's constituency. The Concertaci6n's
platform, characterized by the slogan "growth with equity," called for retaining many of the prior
administration's market oriented/fiscally responsible policies, but combining these with greater
social spending and poverty reduction, (Weyland, 1997). One objective was to reduce the
housing shortage of the urban poor, which would require EMOS to increase further its rate of
expansion. Santiago's poor could credibly threaten to withdraw support for the coalition if the
Aylwin government did not deliver on its social promises. 29 The reform would benefit them
directly through increased coverage and indirectly by generating funds for government spending.
Institutional factors were important in creating another motivation for the reform.
Constitutional constraints on increasing government expenditures and shifting funds among
ministries made it hard for the new administration to reduce its large debt overhang and keep its
commitment to expand social spending. The administration was mindful that voters in general
and private businesses in particular were concerned that the new government would fuel inflation
through deficit spending. 30 By moving ahead with the reform they could raise tariffs enough to
allow EMOS to pay dividends that the Aylwin government could use to expand spending in areas
29  For example, in the 1989 congressional elections the two poorest voting districts in the Metropolitan Region cast
19 and 24 percent of their ballots for the socialist party or other candidates outside the two main coalitions,
compared to 11 percent in the metropolitan region as a whole (El Mercurio, Dec. 16, 1989).
30  In polls just before the election voters rated inflation and price increases as their number 4 fear of an Aylwin
presidency (27.5 percent rated it number one) and economic recession ranked 6th  (11.9 percent rated it first).  In
contrast inflation and price increases was the 6'  ranked fear for a Bilchi presidency (15 percent rated it first), and
economic recession was 8'  (9.7 percent rated it first).  Mendez 1990. Polls also suggested strong popular support
against substantial changes in the free market economic model of the Pinochet administration (Economist
Intelligence Unit 1990). Saez 1996 found that any increase in voter pessimism about the economy favored the
center-right parties and hurt the Christian Democrats in the 1993 elections.26
important to its constituent base without spurring inflation. At the same time the subsidy to
poorer consumers could effectively defuse the adverse political consequences of steep rises in
water rates by reducing the cost to a broad range of poor and middle income constituents (see
Annex A).
The amount of additional revenues the administration got from EMOS' dividends totaled
$75 million from 1990 to 1994. This amount would not have been large enough to motivate the
Pinochet administration to prefer reform to privatization, since the sale of EMOS would generate
both the $150 million purchase price and tax revenues.  But these additional discretionary funds
were important to the Aylwin government since they helped it overcome the inflexibility created
by the constitutional rules while avoiding the politically distasteful step of privatization. 3
II.  Characteristics of the Reform
One characteristic of particular interest in the EMOS case is that the reform was designed
for a private firm but implemented in a state owned enterprise.  Evidence from similar efforts in
other developing countries suggest that contracts between government and an SOE designed to
mimic private agreements typically fail (Shirley and Xu, 1998, 1999). Regardless of
ownership, a contract can be expected to improve operating efficiency and investment only if it:
(i) reduces government's information asymmetry vis-a-vis management; (ii) provides
management with greater incentives to comply with the contract; and (iii) provides more credible
"  Many  of the state enterprises  which  had been  sold since 1983  were  heavily indebted  and had been  privatized
without  their debts. As a result,  by 1990  the state  enterprise  holding  company  (Corporaci6n  Nacional  de Foment,
CORFO)  held  US$ 500  million  in debt. In contrast,  EMOS  had a very small  debt; in 1990  its debt:equity  ratio was
only 10 percent. See Boldez  and  Cary 1997  for details  on the constitution  imnposed  constraints  on raising  spending27
signals that government is committed to enforce the contract and adhere to any promises it has
made. 32 These necessary conditions are usually not met in contracts with SOEs, first the failure
to auction the contract or otherwise simulate competition robs government of a tool to reduce
information asymmetries and motivate performance. Second, government incentives tend to
make for weak monitoring.  Monitors are typically low paid civil servants who cannot effectively
demand information from more powerful SOE managers and who may not be rewarded for
finding politically embarrassing failures. Third, incentives to SOE managers are usually low-
powered.  It may be politically difficult to provide substantial bonuses to government employees
or government may prefer low-powered rewards out of a fear that reneging by the SOE will go
undetected.  Threats of takeover, bankruptcy or firing for poor performance are seldom credible
in SOEs. Fourth, commitment is a problem in any contract with a sovereign authority.  The
problem is exacerbated in contracts with SOEs because state enterprise is an involuntary partner
to the agreement and cannot demand safeguards against government reneging as a condition for
signing.  Moreover, state enterprises are not usually granted access to neutral enforcement
mechanisms, such as courts.  Finally, institutions to support an effective contract, such as strong
budget constraints on the SOE or norms of efficient conduct in bureaucracy, are usually absent in
developing countries.
or shifting funds.
32  Although this hypothesis was originally formulated for cases of PSP and privatization, the same conditions have
been shown to apply to contracts with SOEs  (see World Bank 1995). See also Sappington (1991), Lafont and
Tirole (1986, 1993) and Willamson (1976 and 1985).28
This section examines how Santiago's "regulatory contract", in the sense of the implicit
and explicit agreements between government and enterprise, overcame the agency problems and
improved information, incentives and commitment under state ownership.
A.  Information
The new contract with EMOS had the potential to increase government's information
through more and better accounting, greater competition, and better supervision.  Although the
opportunities for increased competition were not fully exploited, accounting and supervision
were improved.  All the water companies were now required to produce audited annual accounts
according to generally accepted standards. Although EMOS had produced extensive statistics on
its operations before incorporation, it did not have a balance sheet or income statement until its
first annual report after its incorporation in 1988.33
The reform greatly strengthened monitoring, by replacing a hands-on government agency
with an independent, arms-length regulator.  Before reform, EMOS was under the supervision of
SENDOS (Servicio Nacional de Obras Sanitarias), an arm of the Ministry of Public Works.
Since SENDOS was preoccupied with managing the regional water companies, EMOS was
largely autonomous.  The reform created an independent regulatory agency, the Superintendency
of Sanitary Services (SSS), designed to signal government's commitment to potential private
investors and assure that privatization of a monopoly would not lead to consumer exploitation.
3  The World Bank had produced estimated accounts for EMOS prior to 1988 for use in its project documents and
supervision reports, but these could not serve the same monitoring purpose as an annual report.  They were not
produced on a regular basis, did not track clearly with EMOS' statistics, involved judgments by outsiders, and were
not always accepted by EMOS management or the government.  In the preparation of this case we were unable to29
The organizational design of the SSS was detailed in a law that mandated a small, professional
staff with above average civil service salaries. 34 Unlike SENDOS, the SSS had no management
responsibilities. Its focus was on tariff setting and monitoring compliance with investment plans
and standards. The SSS' maximum professional staff cannot exceed 45 according to the law,
(although through short-term contracts it had grown to 61 professionals in 1997); in contrast
SENDOS had over 300 staff when it was dissolved in 1990.35  Although the staff of both
agencies were civil servants, the salaries for SSS professionals were similar to those of bank or
stock market regulators (fiscalizadoras), and hence higher than those which SENDOS could pay.
All SSS professional staff had at least a B.A., which was not true in SENDOS, and most were
engineers. (There is still room for improvement, since few of the SSS staff are civil engineers or
economists, and most do not have a background in water and sanitation (field interviews, former
and current Superintendency staff).)
The SSS monitors EMOS to assure compliance with quality standards and investment
plans, and to measure costs and efficiency in the context of tariff adjustments. 36 Information on
quality and investment was always good; the main improvement was in accounting information.
Companies must submit regular information on costs and service to the SSS and can be fined if
they fail to do so. As we explain in the next section on incentives, tariff policy was designed to
match the World Bank's version of EMOS accounts with those produced by the company for the same years.
34  Its responsibilities are to: (i) set tariffs; (ii) set and enforce technical standards; (iii) monitor, award and revoke
water and sewerage concessions; and (iv) control liquid industrial effluent.
3  As can be seen in figure I of the statistical appendix, the SSS is organized by function, with most staff assigned
to setting and regulating standards (22, of which 15 are engineers) and setting tariffs (15, of which 9 are engineers).
The term engineers includes commercial engineers who have the equivalent of an economics/business degree.
36  Quality is also monitored by the Ministry of Health.30
minimize the effects of information asymmetries by reducing the regulator's dependence on
company information and the company's ability to manipulate the computations. Nevertheless,
the information demands for tariff revision are still large, but less frequent since tariffs are
revised only every five years.
The reform created the potential to use competition to extract more information, but this
opportunity has not been exploited. The new legislation transformed all water and sewerage
services into concessions.  Since existing service operators were granted indefinite rights to their
current concession areas at the time the legislation was approved, much potential for competition
was lost.  However, there can still be competition for new concessions, as well as for older
concessions that had been revoked because the company failed to meet regulatory standards.
Thus far, the regulator has been loath to revoke concessions that failed to meet standards, and has
seldom used competition to award new concessions either. 37 None of the concessions in Santiago
have been bid. 3"
Since the reform introduced standardized accounting, the regulator could also compare
among firms to determine best practice. Yardstick competition among the Chilean water
companies would be least effective for EMOS since it is larger and better managed than the other
water companies in Chile. EMOS could be compared with international standards, but as we
3  The law allows new concessions to be awarded without competition at the regulator's discretion unless a
competitor mounts a challenge. An interested provider produces a concession proposal, which is then published in
the official paper, and if no competitor chooses to challenge it within 60 days, it can be awarded without bids
(although a call for bids can still be issued at the discretion of the government). Ley General de Servicos Sanitarios
No. 382.
3  Although the private water company in Santiago was sold (to a private electricity company), the
Superintendency did not consider that grounds for rebidding the concession. Concessions have been bid in other
parts of Chile.31
shall show, the particular international and national standards used for tariff setting  for each
company were secret and hence less useful for yardstick competition.  This secrecy makes it hard
for company management to perceive how they would be rewarded for, e.g., bringing water
losses down.
A third way to reduce government's information asymmetry was to give interest groups
with an incentive to inform government about abuses of EMOS' monopoly position, such as
water consumers, positions on the board or standing in regulatory decision making.  However, as
is typical in SOEs everywhere, directors were chosen so as to reward political factions rather
than to increase government's information. Regulatory decisions are not open, and no interests
are represented besides government and enterprise.
B.  Incentives
The most important change in incentives was the result of the new tariff policy, which we
discuss first.  Several supportive institutions were key to the incentive effects of tariffs, as we
also explain.
(i) TariffPolicy.  Before the reform, tariff decisions were internal to the bureaucracy, ad
hoc, and vulnerable to political manipulation. As we have already seen, tariffs were increased
only infrequently, when the political liability of unmet demand and deteriorating service
exceeded the political cost of raising tariffs. The reform not only led to higher tariffs, it also
increased transparency, consistency and public accountability.
All of the formulas and definitions of the variables to be used for tariff setting are spelled
out in great detail in the legislation, down to how to calculate peak and off peak monthly tariffs.
As we shall see, this legalism and lack of regulatory discretion have proved a good fit with32
Chile's institutions.  Tariff increases becamne  automatic and the effect was a sharp rise in water
and sewerage prices phased in over five years, see Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Average Price of Sewerage
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Tariff policy had been designed both to signal to a private investor that government was
committed to not expropriating their return-on-capital through under-pricing and to curtail the
chance of monopoly rents. Tariffs are calculated every five years to cover the long run marginal
cost of a "model" or benchmark company, and then readjusted to permit a "reasonable" return on
assets, i.e. to cover long run average costs and allow at least a seven percent return on capital.  To
reduce the risk of monopoly rents the construction of the model company was a black box, which
was expected to make it harder for the company to manipulate information.33
The result was a complex process, see Figure 3.  First, a benchmark efficient firm is
estimated for each water company, based on the company's actual geographic, demographic and
technological conditions, but setting certain parameters (such as unaccounted-for-water,
collection rates and capital costs) at "efficient" levels. 39 This "model" company is derived from a
computer program that uses a mix of international and local standards adapted to the
circumstances of the individual company. In the second step, the tariff is set to cover new
investment plus operation and maintenance costs associated with meeting forecast demand
growth, and to allow the benchmark firm to earn a minimum annual return on assets of at least 7
percent.  Third, the tariff calculated in the first step is adjusted by a factor derived by comparing
projected average long run costs with projected revenues from step two for the next five years to
assure that the company can break even over the five years.  Finally, the water tariff is indexed to
a price index.
The tariff has incentive properties similar to a price cap since it is set on the basis of an
efficient ,model company for five years and indexed for inflation. If EMOS can be more efficient
than the model, it eams additional profits, giving the company an incentive to maximize its
efficiency.  At the end of the period tariffs may be adjusted downward to force the company to
share its gains with consumers.
3  These parameters were set through a survey of five companies in Chile plus international standards.  For
example, the billing collection rate is set at 100 percent, unaccounted-for-water at 20 percent.  Capital costs are set
using a CAPM model where the risk free rate is set equal to the state bank deposit rate and the risk premium is
based on international rates.34
Figure 3. Tariff Setting Process
Chile:  Tariff  Setting
BEIuet  LON  Run  TOWa
Tarflt:  Codt
D  l  | ltRam  R  rnw  t Cost  (qbnued
D1111.  z  'ilD  i  llt  Lor Run  ToW  Cost
Diswint  on  Pm  tm  ~TbidPat
|Eglident  Taft  N  Lon-tffn  Tod osts
|  Se  g  Taifs
a  PRalostoaplatlagep  nyh  bnrdaTenie  yspedy  ofottafie  affp
b  D9xt  f  on  pm  nfUrcm  wSm  cidetaeOapnSe
S&x.  SSS35
The incentive properties of the price cap was reduced somewhat because government
demanded most of the returns be paid as dividends. For the first three years after tariff reform the
government required EMOS to pay 100 percent of its net earnings for the previous year as
dividends.  Subsequently EMOS had to remit 65 percent of the prior years profits as dividends;
the remainder could be retained for investment. 40 Because the dividend payment is estimated at
the beginning of the year based on the previous year's profits and profits were increasing rapidly,
there was sufficient surplus for investment and other uses. EMOS management and staff had an
incentive to increase returns, since they got profit sharing bonuses equivalent to 10 percent of
profits for the first five years of the reform, and higher real wages throughout (Figure 4).
Although these wages increases might seem to suggest a soft budget, they apparently just
brought EMOS salaries in line with the market; a recent consultant study suggests that EMOS
wages in 1996 were close to market standards. 4'
40  In 1998 the government announced a plan to return to 100 percent dividends.
41  The study (by Langton Clarke Consultants) has the following comparison of 1996 annual salaries:
EMOS  MARKET
Professionals, managers  US$ 30,854  US$ 30,883
Technicians  US$  13.954  US$  15.098
Administrative  US$ 11.701  US$ 14,743
Service (guards, drivers, etc.)  US$ 11,003  US$  9,57636
Figure 4. Average Salary
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(ii) Supportive Institutions.  The incentive effects of higher revenues were supported by
several strong institutions that help explain why the increased funds generated from the tariff led
to performance improvements, despite agency problems and continued information asymmetry.
Among these were Chile's civil service norms and traditions of professionalism and honesty in
public service.  These norms were strong in EMOS. Field interviews suggest that its reputation of
being one of the best performing water companies in the region for many decades before the
1988-89 reform motivated EMOS' management to strive to improve performance before and
after reform. This tradition of professionalism also explains why the Aylwin government
selected an experienced, well qualified and competent manager to run EMOS and allowed her to
select an equally competent team. 42
Also important was the regulation introduced by the Pinochet government in the late
1970's that had created hard budget constraints in the government and state enterprises.
42  Since most EMOS staff were supporters of the new government and democracy, they had a further incentive to
increase effort to try to make reform under state ownership succeed (field interviews).37
Borrowing was strictly curtailed, most transfers and subsidies were eliminated, and state
enterprises were required to pay dividends. As part of this effort, the staff of EMOS had been
reduced in 1977 and most services, procured through outsourcing. SOEs were not allowed to
exceed a debt-equity ratio of 15 percent and EMOS maintained a very low debt: equity ratio
throughout the 1980's and in the post reform period of the 1990's (Figure 5). Investment
increased during this period, as we discuss in the Section III, and was financed almost entirely by
internal funds (Figure 6).38
Figure 5. EMOS Debt to Equity Ratio (%lo)
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Finally, EMOS continued to face the prospect of privatization. The debate over
privatizing EMOS continued after Aylwin's election and a bill to authorize privatization of 65
percent of shares has been pending in Congress since 1993. (EMOS was sold in 1999.)
Studies have found that SOE performance improves with the prospect of privatization, especially
when staff expect to receive shares in the company.
C.  Credible Commitment
A weak point in most contracts between government and SOEs is the lack of credible
commitment, especially on the part of government actors (Shirley and Xu 1998). If a contract39
specifies no enforcement mechanism or other recourse against government reneging,
management will not expect to receive the promised incentives or to be penalized for poor
performance.  Mangers will not increase effort, instead they will try to exploit their information
advantage to bargain down their targets ex post.  Once again the design of a contract intended for
a private operator led to a different outcome from the usual in Chile.
The regulatory contract for EMOS signals government commitment by specifying neutral
and automatic enforcement. Any water company can appeal a dispute over tariffs to the SSS
within 30 days.  If the SSS and the company fail to reach agreement, a panel of three arbitrators -
- one appointed by the company, one by the government and one jointly agreed -- has 37 days to
reach a decision that both sides must accept. Decisions can also be appealed to the courts, which
are regarded as honest and independent, although slow, but an SOE would be less likely to be
able to use this route.
The fact that state owned companies can appeal the decision of a government regulator
increases the credibility of the contract. Moreover, this ability to arbitrate a tariff decision has
not been a theoretical privilege. So far water tariffs have been set twice under the reformed
procedures; once in 1990 when the system was first implemented and again in 1995. The first
tariffs were gradually phased in over five years and did not generate appeals since they led to an
average real increase in tariffs in the first year alone of almost 25 percent for all water
companies, 20 percent for EMOS. The second round of tariff setting led to much lower
increases: on average the real annual increase awarded companies was 5.9 percent, while EMOS'
tariffs were reduced by 1.2 percent a year in real terms for 93 percent of its customer base and
raised by 6.8 percent for the remainder (SSS 1995). Five companies took disputes over tariffs to
arbitration, including EMOS, two other SOEs and the two largest of the six private companies40
(one of which operates in Santiago). EMOS' dispute was on the capital costs, which SSS had set
at 7.5 percent and EMOS argued should be 10 percent. The arbitrators decided on 9.16 percent.
A second source of credibility is the lack of regulatory discretion.  The tariff calculations
are detailed in laws that, as we have seen, are hard to change. The SSS relies on a computer
model designed by external consultants to comply with this law, which could not be easily
manipulated for political purposes.
Credibility was also enhanced by a third tool, a means tested subsidy, which reduced the
political pressure against tariff increases.  On average 60 percent of the bill for the first 20 cubic
meters of consumption of qualified low-income households is paid by taxpayers; government
transfers the funds directly to the water companies (see Annex 1 for details).  The number of
recipients has grown with tariff increases (Figure 7), an easing of the subsidy's limits and
requirements, and a public information campaign by the water companies.  In 1996 about a third
of recipient households were in the lowest income quartile and another third in the second
lowest.  This spillover of benefits to middle income groups added to political constituency
affected by the subsidy.
Figure 7. Number of Subsidy Recipients
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A number of the institutional safeguards described above supported the government's
credible commitment to the regulatory contract. These included: the set of laws and regulations41
that underlay the contract plus the political institutions that made it difficult to overturn this
legislation, and norms of behavior and legal strictures supporting efficiency and competitiveness
in state owned enterprises.  The new government signaled that it would support these norms by,
for example, moving quickly to implement the tariff system and appointing a well-qualified
insider to run the company. Although there were violations of the implicit contract, such as
political appointments to the board and ministerial interference in some internal decisions, these
did not threaten the tariff, which was the most important change from the previous regulation.
Finally, factor endowments offered safeguards. Cost of usage was low since Santiago's
principal water sources were sustainable at current and projected rates of extraction, and the
system is gravity fed.  As a result, even with the 25 percent increase in tariffs between 1990 and
1996, water tariffs in Santiago were still relatively low compared to a sample of six water
companies. 43 THE TARIFF INCREASE WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN 25%. THE FIXED
CHARGE INCREASE 125%, METRIC TARIFF WITH SUBSIDY 261% AND REGULAR
METRIC CHARGE 64% IN CONSTANT 1996 DOLLARS.
II.  Effects of the Reform on Performance and Welfare
We present evidence in this section that, despite relatively good initial conditions, the
reform led to improvements in performance and welfare that were important in magnitude.  This
section first presents partial performance indicators and then describes net economic benefits.
43  Santiago's average revenues collected per M 3 distributed (minus UFW) was US$0.29 in 1996,  higher than
Buenos Aires or Mexico City (at US$0.23/M 3), but lower than Lima (US$0.32), Abidjan (US$0.51) or Conakry
(US$0.74).  Unlike Santiago and Buenos Aires, Mexico City's tariffs do not cover marginal cost and return on
investments.42
A.  Performance Effects
The new tariff policy allowed an increase in real investment (see Figure 8) that enabled
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Market coverage for water reached 100 percent soon after the reform and stayed there,
while sewerage coverage increased from 88 percent at the start of the reform to 97 percent from
1994 onwards (Figure 9).  Since demand for connections accelerated as the Alywin government
increased the pace of public housing construction while private construction rose with rising
incomes during this boom period, EMOS had to increase the number of new connections to keep
coverage constant (Figure 10). EMOS also expanded its concession area to include poor
municipalities on the periphery of Santiago, subsidizing customers who could not afford to pay
their requisite share of the cost of connecting (Alfaro, 1996).4
4  EMOS also allowed middle income consumers to pay the cost of connection in 12 to 20 installments; low
income families (those certified for subsidies, see Annex A) to pay in 60 installments; and the very poor (again with
certification) to pay a fraction of the cost US$5 to $10 in ten installments. Alfaro 1996.43
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Another benefit came from EMOS' ability to finance investments in maintenance, which
allowed it to upgrade pipes and thus reduce water losses and improve pressure. The number of
pipe breaks per kilometer dropped from over 0.52 in 1988 to 0.31 by 1994.  As a result, the trend
in unaccounted -for--water (UFW) which had been largely caused by physical losses, was
reversed and UFW was brought close to international standards of 20 percent of production
(Figure 11).44




30%  - --  - --  - - --  - -
0%
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Source:EMOS Annual Reports & Statistical  Buletins
The main cost to consumers from the reform was higher prices.  Since all connections
were metered and billing was efficient, price increases had a direct effect on consumer welfare,
although this was partly offset by the subsidies described earlier. Nevertheless, Figure 12 points
to a continuously declining trend in average monthly water consumption per connection, which
suggests that consumers responded to rising prices by cubing consumption. EMOS launched a
campaign during this period to educate consumers on reducing water wastage. It could also be
that the rise in housing construction reduced the extent of shared housing. 45
"4  An estimated 16 percent of housing was shared in some way in 1982. This probably increased with the
destruction of much rental housing in the 1985 earthquake and a faster rate of removal of squatter settlements than
of construction of new subsidized housing during the Pinochet administration.  Gilbert 1993.45
Figure 12. Average Monthly  Water Consumption per Connection
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Partial indicators suggest that the reform increased EMOS' already high productivity
even though total factor productivity did not change much. Although the number of employees
increased slightly, the workers per thousand connections declined to 1.76 in 1996 (Figure 13).
Figure 13. Employees Per 1000 Water Connections
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The growth in intermediate inputs also suggests productivity was improving. Real growth
in the value of intermediate inputs per cubic meter of water production declined from an average
of 9.1 percent a year to less than 4 percent a year after the reforms (Figure 14).46
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Despite these improvements in partial productivity indicators, EMOS' total factor
productivity (TFP) showed little change, with inputs hovering at around 60 percent of outputs
from 1988 to 1996 (Figure 15). These numbers are misleading, however, since they count the
cost of EMOS' increased investment in maintenance, but fail to take into account the value of the
improved quality of service, including better pressure and fewer interruptions.
Figure 15. Total Factor Productivity
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B.  Welfare Consequences of the Reform
We calculated the welfare effects of the reform by comparing the net benefits from the
actual reform with a counterfactual assuming no reform. 46 As we shall show the net gains are
important, even when compared with Buenos Aires, a city with much less favorable initial
conditions.  This section begins with a brief summary of the methodology; it then describes the
welfare gains; it concludes with some sensitivity analysis.
(i)  Methodology. To construct the counterfactual for 1989 to 1998, we projected the key
parameters --including price and quantity of water and sewerage, unit costs of labor and
intermediate inputs-on  the basis of their linear trends from 1981 to 1988.47  We projected the
counterfactual EMOS' investment based on two assumptions: (1) that the ratio of output to fixed
capital would stay at 1988 levels; and (2) that any additional investment needed to maintain that
ratio would be financed by retained earnings.
In order to have a "factual" time period of at least ten years we also projected the factual
scenario for two years beyond the end of our observations: 1997 and 1998.48  We projected
investment using the same two assumptions as for the counterfactual, and fixed the other key
ratios equal to those of the last year of the observed period, 1996.
46  We used a partial equilibrium cost-benefit methodology developed by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990).
47  Labor productivity is assumed to be constant in both scenarios, although salaries as assumed to be higher under
the "factual".
48  Although another study using this methodology (Galal et al 1994) used a much longer projection period, we
concluded that further projection would entail too much prediction error, and the large discounting factors beyond
the year 1998 would make this omission largely unimportant to our results.48
We calculated consumer surplus using an elasticity of -0.26 and assuming that the shape
of the demand curve was the same shape for the factual and the counterfactual. 49 We also
assumed that at the start of the reforms in 1988 total demand was equal to all potential demand in
the EMOS service area, so that unconnected customers were treated as excess demand, which
seems reasonable given the low price for water that year (US$ 0.14). We further assumed that
new connections have been rationed by willingness to pay, in other words that most wealthy
people who would be willing to pay more than the price of connecting were already connected at
the time of the reform. This seems reasonable given that the government was building
subsidized housing and EMOS was now subsidizing the costs of connection for poorer people in
new sites and services areas. For more on methodology see Appendix A.
This cost-benefit methodology has its limitations.  Although we tried to take into account
as many relevant details as possible in constructing our factual and counterfactual scenarios, we
necessarily had to leave out many unquantifiable factors. Thus, the analysis does not take into
account benefits from improvements in quality mentioned above or social costs and benefits,
which we discuss in the section below on privatization. In addition, our assumption that without
reform EMOS would have followed its pre-reform trends may bias the welfare gains upward.
We therefore consider some alternative assumptions in our sensitivity analysis below.
This elasticity comes from a SENDOS study of water demand in Santiago, which fnds  a price elasticity of -
0.516 for households which consume 1-20 m 3 of water, -0.2 for 20-30 in3, and -0.25 for more than 30 m 3. We know
that the consumption patterns among households in Santiago; 5% of households use 1-10  m
3 per month, 40% use
10-30 m 3 per month, and 55% use more than 30 m 3 per month. This suggests that the weighted average elasticity is:
0.10*(-0.516)+0.35* (-0.20)+0.55*(-0.25)=-0.259. We did not include the demand elasticity of industrial and
commercial users because this category accounts for only 5.8% of total use according to EMOS, Annual Report
1990. This elasticity is similar to that assumed for Buenos Aires, Argentina (-0.32).49
(ii.)  Welfare gains, winners and losers. The reform led to cumulative domestic gains in
the ten post reform years of about US$214 million net present value (NPV) in 1988 prices
(Table 6).5° Since these gains are really a flow of funds that goes on in perpetuity, we can get
some sense of how significant they were by expressing them as a percent of another flow, namely
EMOS' annual sales.  The gains were large, equivalent to 52% of EMOS 1988 sales every year
in perpetuity. By way of comparison, the gains In 1996 dollars were approximately US$64 per
capita (NPV). Using the same methodology, the estimated NPV of gains (in 1996 dollars) from
ten years of concession contract in Buenos Aires, using the same methodology, were about
US$150 per capita (Alcazar, Abdala, and Zuluaga, 1999). We would expect the gains in Buenos
Aires to be larger since Santiago's  system was well run to begin with, while the Buenos Aires'
concession reduced prices by almost 27 percent, expanded water coverage from 70 to 81 percent
and improved efficiency under very poor initial conditions.
In contrast to Buenos Aires, however, where consumers were the big winners, the biggest
winner from the EMOS'  reform was the government. Thanks to increased taxes and dividends,
government gained a NPV of roughly US$ 181.5 million in 1988 prices, or the equivalent of
44% of EMOS'  1988 annual sales in perpetuity. 5'
5  Domestic gains are almost the same as total gains since foreign participation was very small.
51  The average exchange rate for 1988 was 245.01 pesos/US$.50
Table 6.  Winners and Losers  from Reform
(NPV, in 1988 US dollars unless stated otherwise)
Govem-  Domestic  Workers  Consumers  Total
ment  Investors  Domestic
Welfare  gains (1988  US$  millions)  $181.5  $0.7  $29.0  $3.07  $214.3
Welfare  gains/1988  sales  (%/O)  44%  0.2%  7.1%  0.8%  52.3%
Annual  welfare  gains for each  group  $1,710/  $0.39/  $4.80  per
(1988  US$)  employee  connection  capita
Source:  authors' calculations.
Consumers did less well, reaping a gain of roughly US$3 million (NPV in 1988 prices) or
about US$0.40 per connection. Although the consumer surplus was reduced by price increases,
this was offset by the gain from the pace of increased connections. Consumers' gains are
understated somewhat because we do not include the benefits of higher pressure and reliability.
This gain is very sensitive to our assumption that connections were rationed by willingness to
pay, as we explain below.
Employees also benefited, thanks to higher wages, by about US$ 29 million (NPV in
1988 prices). 52 The net present value of a typical worker's gains was about US$ 1,710 a year in
real terms.  Finally, EMOS' few private shareholders also gained modestly, by US$ 0.7 million.
(iii.) Sensitivity analysis. Although we tried to make plausible assumptions about the
counterfactual scenario, we also conducted sensitivity tests to examine whether the main
qualitative results remain intact when we change one key parameter from the base (Table 7).  The
qualitative conclusions, that there were large gains and that government is a major winner,
remained robust with respect to alternative assumptions.
52  The gains for workers  are computed  as the net discounted  present  value of the wage  differences  in the factual
and  the counterfactual.  The wage  of the counterfactual  is projected  on the basis of the historical  trend.51
Consumer surplus is the most sensitive to changes in parameters. If we assume that
excess demand was rationed randomly instead of by willingness-to-pay, then the consumer
surplus increases from a NPV of US$3 million to US$ 155 million (1988 prices). This scenario
is unlikely, however, since, as we have seen, most of those who were unconnected were poor.  If
we assume that the price elasticity is -0.2 instead of -0.259, then consumer gains are roughly
US$ 30.31 million (NPV in 1988 prices). The former elasticity is closer to that of industrial and
commercial consumers and other heavy water users. In contrast, if the price elasticity was
higher, -0.3, then the consumer surplus becomes negative -US$ 9.49 million.  This elasticity is
probably the upper bound for Santiago and it seems unrealistic that it would apply to most
customers.
Table 7. Welfare Gains underAlternativeAssumptions
(NPV in 1988 US$ millions and as % of 1988 EMOS Sales)
Base  Random  Elasticity  Elasticity  Counterfactual  Counterfactual
Rationing  0.20  0.30  Intermediate Inputs  Labor =
Equals the Actual  Actual
GOVERNMENT  $181.5  $181.5  $181.5  $181.5  $164.9  $203.0
44.3%  44.3%  44.3%  44.3%  40.3%  49.5%
DOMESTIC  INVESTORS  $0.8  $0.8  $0.8  $0.8  $0.8  $0.8
0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%
WORKERS  $29.0  $29.0  $29.0  $29.0  $29.0  $0.0
7.1%  7.1%  7.1%  7.1%  7.1%  0.0%
CONSUMERS  $3.1  $155.6  $30.3  -$9.5  $3.1  $3.1
0.8%  37.8%  7.4%  -2.3%  0.8%  0.8%
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  $214.3  $366.9  $241.6  $201.7  $197.8  $206.9
52.3%  89.5%  58.9%  49.2%  48.3%  50.5%
Note. Total  (domestic  and foreign)  welfare  gain  is not presented  because  it is generally  very close  to total domestic
welfare  gain.
Other changes in assumptions have less effect on the results.  Thus, we tested what would
have happened if the counterfactual EMOS had used intermediate inputs as efficiently as the post
reform EMOS did, instead of projecting their use on the basis of the company's historical trend.52
Under this assumption, the efficiency gains from the reform decline only slightly compared to
the base case (Table 7).  We also tested what would have happened had unit labor costs under the
counterfactual grown as much as in the factual instead of following historical trends.  In this
scenario, government's revenues in the counterfactual are less because EMOS'  costs are higher,
so its gains from the reform are greater, while workers gains from the reform disappear.  The net
total welfare gains drop slightly compared to the base.
C.  What if EMOS Had Been Privatized?
In this section we speculate on how a private EMOS might have differed from the actual.
Such speculation is not idle since EMOS was privatized in 1999. Imagining what would have
happened had EMOS been sold in 1990 helps illustrate some ways in which incentives are likely
to differ under private operation.
First, most observers consulted in Chile expected that a private EMOS would have built a
sewage treatment plant five to ten years after sale. Instead, EMOS' current plan is to have 100%
sewage treatment in 2024.53 The argument favoring faster action by a private EMOS is based on
two observations. One is that EMOS had strong incentives to build treatment facilities since
tariff regulations assure at least a 7 percent a return on its investment, plus the company could
sell treated wastewater to farmers. The second is that the project was delayed because of
5  The wastewater collection system of Greater Santiago is made up of a network of 6,500 km of sewer mains that
evacuate a current average flow of 13 m3/s. The flow is expected to increase to 25m3/s by the year 2024.  The
wastewater collected is discharged without treatment in more than 40 points along three major natural channels that
drain the metropolitan area. Some areas are highly polluted, especially areas irrigated by the Zanjon de la Aguada
and the central and lower Mapocho River. In 1990, the total agricultural area irrigated with the polluted water from
the canals was on the order of 130,000  hectares.53
government imposed constraints on EMOS' borrowing and slow, bureaucratic decision-making
in the public sector which a private firm would not have faced. There are two main counter-
arguments.  The first is that a private owner would have not have acted out of fear of a strong
political reaction against raising tariffs to cover sewage treatment, which is expected to double
charges for water service.  5  The commitment mechanisms we have described and the presence
of a water subsidy, however, make it more likely that the government would have increased
tariffs as mandated by the law.  The second counter argument is that private operators would
have been put off by farmers' apparently low willingness-to-pay for treated water. However
estimates of willingness-to-pay vary. 5 Moreover, it seems plausible that the government would
outlaw irrigation of all foodstuffs with untreated sewage once a supply of treated wastewater
becomes available. In any case sales to farmers are not necessary to make sewage treatment
profitable as long as the tariff policy is sustained.
5  EMOS  expects  the combined  water  and sewerage  tariff,  which  is currently  US$0.40  per M 3 of water,  to increase
by US$0.  10 M 3 because  of wastewater  treatment  the first  year of the project,  by US$0.16  M 3 the fifth year and by
US$0.40  M 3by the tenth  year.
5  According  to surveys,  farmers  were  willing  to pay about one  to three Chilean  pesos/m3  for untreated  irrigation
water from the Puclaro  reservoir  in 1991/92  (Aninat  et al., 1993). Farmers  might  be willing  to pay more  now since
prohibitions  on irrigation  of low-growing  foodstuffs  were  put in place  after this survey. A few  recent  purchases  of
raw  water in the SMR  for municipal  and industrial  uses suggest  much  higher  prices,  equivalent  to 64 pesos/m3  (or
US$0.  16/m3).54
Table 8. Annual Cost and Benefits of Sewage Treatment in Santiago
(in millions of 1994 US$)
Benefits:a  $24.1-79.0  Costs:d  $61.6
Avoided  cases of cholera  $ 2.9-14.7
Avoided  cases of typhoid  $ 0.3- 1.4  Net total benefits:  ($37.5)- 17.4
Net impact  on farm  profitabilityb  $ 5.8
Avoided  losses of farm exports  $10.0-50.0
Reduced  consumer  costsC  $ 4.1
Sale  of treated  wastewater  $ 1.0- 3.0
aLow  end of range assumes  emergency  measures  fail every one  year in five,  high end assumes  annually.
b Brzovic  1993  calculated  the annual loss  from reduced  yields  at US$ 0.6  million  and  from the reduction  in irrigated
areas  at US$  4.3 million,  against  the revenue  gain to farmers  from  producing  vegetables  on prohibited  acerage
estimated  at US$  6.4 million  a year.
cAssumes  a rollback  in price increases  for crops  which  currently  cannot  be irrigated  with  wastewater.
'Assumes  an average  annual  sewage  flow of 18  M 3 and  a cost  per M 3 treated  of US$0.109  including  investment,
amortization,  operation  and  maintenance.
Source:  World  Bank 1994,  Brzovic  1993,  Fernandez  1993,  Poblete,  1993  and authors' calculations.
Drawing on World Bank 1994 we estimated that full sewage treatment 25 to 30 years
earlier would have led to the range of net benefits shown in Table 8.56 In 1991 the government
put into effect a number of emergency measures in the face of the threat of cholera spreading
from Peru that reduced the number of cases of cholera and typhoid attributable to irrigation with
untreated sewage.  5  The benefits in Table 8 are based on these reduced rates of mortality and
morbidity.
By far the largest potential benefit comes from the reduced risk to earnings from
agricultural exports should these emergency measures fail. Based on the consequences of trade
restrictions on Chile's fruit exports because of a health scare in 1989, World Bank 1994 assumed
56  This  analysis  draws  heavily  on World  Bank 1994,  Chapter  2 "Water  Pollution  in Santiago:  Health  Impacts  and
Policy  Alternatives".
"  Specifically,  the government  prohibited  irrigation  of low  growing  vegetables  with  untreated  sewage  and
restricted  transporting  irrigated  vegetables  and fruits  outside  of the SMR,  intensified  water quality  monitoring,55
that an eventual cholera outbreak would cause huge export losses, which are calculated to be
equivalent to annual losses of at least 5 percent of fruit exports or US$50 million.
Another benefit come from the elimination of cases of typhoid and cholera attributable to
irrigation of food crops with untreated sewage, which is calculated as the average cost of medical
treatment plus earnings lost due to lost work time per case. 's The table also calculates the net
effects on farmers productivity. The treatment of sewage will reduce the fertilizer value in
wastewater, and eliminate it in areas deprived of wastewater by interception, which has a cost to
farmers. However, farners  benefit because they can grow vegetables could be grown in areas
where they are currently banned because the only water available for irrigation is contaminated,
which raises their profits somewhat, although it also reduces consumer prices. The calculations
do not consider the effects of price increases to cover the cost of sewage treatment since the
reduction in consumer surplus is offset by the increase in EMOS' revenue.  Finally, the table
assumes that treated water can be sold, producing additional revenues for EMOS.
Against these benefits Table 8 deducts the cost of sewage treatment, resulting in net
benefits between -US$37.5 and + US$17.4 million in 1994 prices." 9 Although the lower range is
negative, it should be kept in mind that the benefits do not include a reduction in hepatitis and
chlorinated irrigation water in canals, temporarily prohibited serving raw vegetables in restaurants, and intensified
communication campaigns about the risks of vegetables and the need to wash and cook them.
s  Between 1985 and 1990 the average annual direct cost of, for example, typhoid cases attributable to sewage
irrigation of vegetables was $1.4 million per year.
5  EMOS' recent studies suggest that the total lifetime cost for treating 100 percent of the SMR wastewater using
conventional technology will be US$574 million or US$61.6 a year.56
other gastroenteric diseases, benefits to tourism and fishing in coastal waters and the effects to
image and trade negotiations.
Besides perhaps building the sewage treatment plant, there were other ways we might
expect a private EMOS to have behaved differently.  60  In particular there were regulatory
weaknesses that the public EMOS had little motivation or capacity to exploit.  One such
weakness resulted from SSS vulnerability to capture (Sanchez and Sanhueza 1997). SSS
officials could have been influenced by prospective employment opportunities in the regulated
sector if EMOS had been private.  Although the SSS was better paid than its predecessor,
professors of hydraulic and environmental engineering at the University of Chile reported that
most of their graduates were not attracted to the SSS because salaries were low and career
prospects, poor compared to the private sector. The law does not place any restrictions on who
can hold top executive positions at the SSS or what they do when they leave.  The risk of capture
has thus far been low because most of the regulated companies are state-owned, and hence can
offer few inducements.
The SSS was also vulnerable to outright misbehavior by a private EMOS since its ability
to enforce its decisions was weak. If a regulated company failed to comply with SSS technical
standards, requests for information, or requirements under its concession rules, the SSS could
fine the company and in extreme cases revoke the concession. However, the fines are set by law
and were widely regarded as too low to motivate compliance, while in most circumstances
60  It could be that a private EMOS would have been motivated to increase operating efficiency faster since it could
have captured more of the rents than the state owned EMOS, which had to make large dividend payments to
government.  But since EMOS' performance was already good, the welfare gains from this would have been small.57
revoking the concession would have been seen as draconian and politically unacceptable. 61 This
lack of credible sanctions was less of a problem with state enterprises like EMOS because the
SSS could appeal to other government agencies such as the Ministry of Public Works for support
in forcing compliance. 62 A private EMOS would not have been subject to orders from other
govermment  agencies, but would have had to be concerned about its international reputation.
In sum, there were some costs to not privatizing EMOS if we accept that a private firm
would have built the sewerage treatment plant. However, these costs are reduced by the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior on the part of a private operator.
IV.  Conclusion
The reform of EMOS illustrates how a regulatory contract that addresses problems of
information, incentives and commitment, combined with strong supportive institutions, can
produce net benefits even in a relatively well performing water system. It also shows how
institutional factors enabled Chile to overcome the agency problems that usually lead to
contractual failure in SOE performance contracts.
In a situation such as Santiago's, where service was relatively good, such that the political
costs of doing nothing were low, reform seemed unlikely.  Yet a crisis brought in a government
ideologically committed to the sale of EMOS. After the Pinochet government passed legislation
6)  The proposed reform of the SSS would increase fines sharply.  For example, the present fine for providing false
information is the equivalent of US$80,000 and would increase to US$800,000; the fine for poor quality water
would  increase  from US$15,000  to US$80,000.  (Field  Interviews)
62  Indeed, in a randomly selected week from the SSS' weekly report of fines, EMOS was cited for three infractions,
apparently minor judging from the amounts of the fine.  The private firm operating in Santiago, Aguas Cordillera,
was cited for ten infractions, three of them serious, again  judging from the amounts of the fines.  SSS, 1997.58
designed to attract a private investor, motivate efficiency gains and prevent capture, Chile's
political and constitutional constraints made reversal virtually impossible.  Since there were net
political gains to the Aylwin government, the reform was not only tolerated but vigorously
pursued.  On the political benefits side, poor constituents could be connected, service could
improve, and needed revenues could be generated. The existence of a subsidy that was means
targeted but leaked over to middle income consumers reduced opposition to tariff increases
across a broad range of voters.  Although workers were initially opposed, their opposition was
weak to beging with, muted by their support for the new government and lack of alternatives, and
offset by the compensation of collective bargaining, bonuses and other benefits.
A regulatory framework grounded in law that gave limited discretion to the regulator on
pricing was a good fit with Chile's electoral, legislative and legal institutions. Price cap pricing
reinforced the existing incentives motivating efficiency in EMOS.  Supportive norms and
institutions mandating a hard budget reinforced the high powered incentives in the regulatory
contract.
Would Chile have done better if it had privatized EMOS?  If everything else remained the
same, except that a private investor built the sewage treatment plant, then the health of
Santiago's population would have improved, a serious risk to its food exports would have been
mitigated and a source of contamination of its beaches and oceans would have been eliminated.
The benefits of these externalities are hard to estimate, but our best guess suggests that the gains
would have outweighed the costs. However, the assumption that all else would have been be
equal with private ownership of the country's largest water company seems dubious.  A private
investor would have had much stronger incentives to exploit the vulnerabilities of the SSS.  The
net effect of these actions is hard to predict. Recent legislation will correct some of the59
weaknesses of the regulator, through higher salaries (by putting SSS staff on a higher civil
service ranking), limits on how soon SSS staff can be employed by the regulated industry, and
higher fines for regulatory infractions (see Sanchez and Sanhueza 1997 for an excellent
discussion of these issues).
Our findings suggest that the workings of Chile's water regulation could also be
improved by increasing the use of competition. Increasing yardstick competition would require
the SSS to reveal more information to the companies about what standards are used in tariff
setting and simplify the process so that company managers can compare their costs with the
model company.  The risk that the company might manipulate information could be reduced
through greater competitive bidding of concessions and higher sanctions for misinformation. The
incentive effects of yardstick competition could be lost, however, unless the dividend policy is
changed. The incentive for companies to improve their efficiency under the benchmark tariff
used in Chile is curtailed if government captures all the gains through dividends and taxes,
especially for regional companies without the strong reputation effects of EMOS.
Another way to improve information and strengthen the incentive features of the
regulation would be to require competition for all new concessions and for existing concessions
when the current owner fails to live up to important obligations such as to invest or to maintain
water quality over some prolonged period, such as five years.  Greater consumer information and
representation of consumers and other interests in the tariff setting process would also improve
monitoring.
Those looking to Chile as a model might keep in mind three factors present in Chile that
are not typical of most developing country water systems.  First is the long tradition of private
water rights that meant that management of the sector was shaped by a very early recognition of60
water as a scarce and tradable private good.  A second factor is Chile's strong bureaucratic
institutions and norms governing the public sector that prevented EMOS and other SOEs from
operating with the degree of corruption, inefficiency and paralysis common to many water
systems.  Third, Chile's electoral, constitutional and judicial institutions permitted the
introduction of a contract that mimicked a private concession as well as a means-tested subsidy.
Finally, Santiago's relatively low cost water sources helped make it politically possible to price
at full cost recovery.61
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In 1989 Chile created a system of subsidies for water and sewerage, which took effect in
1990. Anyone who holds a social classification card (CAS), has a household water connection
and is not more than three months late in paying their water bill is eligible for the subsidy. The
CAS has been in effect since 1980 and establishes eligibility for a number of targeted subsidies
in addition to water and sewerage, including a flat-rate family allowance, minimum pensions,
and housing assistance. Households applying for a CAS are visited by a municipal official who
allocates points to the family based on the size and composition of the household, the occupation
and education of the household head, the assets (car, refrigerator, land, etc.) and per capita
income of the family, and the characteristics of the dwelling (such as location, number of rooms,
exterior and interior materials used for construction, whether it has a water or electrical
connection, etc.)  Households with less than a maximum number of points are then issued a CAS
and those with lower points receive higher priority for getting subsidies.
The yearly allotments for the water subsidy are based on bi-annual surveys of family
income by region.  The allotments are allocated so as to assure that no family in the region pays
more than five percent of its income for water and sewerage. 63 Regional allotments are then
divided among municipalities based on the number of CAS holders with lower points in each
local area. The municipality then distributes its allotment across the list of eligible beneficiaries,
starting with those with the lowest points, and puts those it cannot cover on a waiting list. 64 The
subsidy is then paid directly to the water supplier, who subtracts the appropriate amount from
each household's water bill and collects the remainder of the bill directly from the customer.
Initially only the first 15 M3 of consumption per month could be subsidized; this was later raised
to 20 M3. By comparison, average consumption for a poor urban family is 20-30 M3 per month.
On average the subsidy covers 60 percent of the water bill of eligible households, although in
regions with high tariffs, up to 85 percent may be covered.
The number of Chilean households covered by the subsidy has gone from 5 percent of
those eligible in 1990 to 95 percent in 1996 (see table A-1). The expansion in coverage was
largely the result of a public education campaign by the water companies to convince eligible
consumers to apply, although an easing of the conditions for eligibility also helped. As a result
of this increased coverage, the total, national cost for the water subsidy has risen from US$ 8,000
in 1990 to US$ 500,000 in 1991 to US$ 30 million in 1996.
Only about a third of the households which received a water subsidy were in the lowest
income quartile, and thirty percent in the second quartile, while some benefits reached even the
63  The five percent is a standard based on the World Health Organization's recommendation that water and
sewerage expenditures should represent no more than one day of a worker's income a month.
4  Persons can lose the subsidy if they fail to pay their share of the water bill, change dwellings, etc.68
upper income quartile (see table A-2).  This distribution by number of households is somewhat
misleading, since the share of the total water subsidy which was received by the upper income
groups is probably much less than for the other groups (data are not available) and the number of
people in a lower income household is much higher. The fact that some subsidies were paid to
upper income groups is partly a result of Chile's highly unequal income distribution, where 96
percent of the households have incomes of less than $1,260 per capita (see table A-3); Chile's per
capita income in 1995 was US$ 4, 805. In addition, the way the subsidies are distributed by
regions means that even a household in the upper quintile could qualify under the "no-more-than-
five-percent-of-income-for-water" rule in some regions.  Only a third of the beneficiaries are in
the lowest quartile, probably because the subsidy cannot reach indigent households
(approximately 5 percent of all households in 1995, see table A-4). The subsidy is only available
to those with a house connection (which requires a fixed dwelling) and who can afford to pay
some part of their bill, which rules out the indigent. (As well as the non-indigent part of the 21
percent of Chile's population that does not have indoor plumbing, most of them in rural areas.)
In addition, some poor families may be discouraged by the need to apply for the subsidy, while
some municipal workers may be duped or corrupted by wealthier beneficiaries.69
Table A-1
Chile:  Coverage of the Subside for Water and Sewerage, 1990-96
Number of  Number of  Usage Rate
Year  Budgeted Subsidies  Subsidies  (%)
Used
1990  424,625  21,824  5.1
1991  424,625  177,719  41.9
1992  441,040  315,901  71.6
1993  443,038  351,925  79.4
1994  454,038  389,712  85.8
1995  461,508  399,205  86.5
1996  466,508  442,524  94.9
Source: MIDEPLAN, 1997.
Table A-2
Chile: Water and Sewerage Subsidy by Income Group, 1996
Per Capita  Average  Number of  Percentage
Income  Household  Subsidy  Beneficiary  Distribution of
Quintile  Income (US$)  (CH$)  Households  Beneficiaries
I  0-250  2,419  64,594  32.7
II  250-440  2,370  59,541  29.6
III  440-680  2,392  43,045  21.6
IV  680-1,260  2,676  24,220  13.6
V  >1,260  2,507  4,920  2.6
Total  2,432  196,320  100.0
Source: MIDEPLAN, 1997.
Table A-3
Chile:  Distribution of Monetary Income by Quintiles, 1987-1996*
(percentages)
Quintile  1987  1990  1992  1994  1996
I  57.2  56.9  56.3  56.9  56.7
II  19.0  18.1  18.4  18.5  19.1
III  11.7  12.3  2.2  12.0  11.9
IV  7.9  8.2  8.5  8.2  8.2
V  4.3  4.4  4.6  4.3  4.1
* Monetary income includes all income to factors of production (i.e., wages, salaries, pensions,
rents, dividends, interest, etc.) plus monetary transfers from the public sector.
Source: MIDEPLAN, 1997.70
Appendix B
Demand Estimation and Consumer Surplus
Since the estimation of demand curve is an integral part of the cost-benefit analysis, this
annex provides more details on the assumptions used for the estimation of demand curve and
consumer surplus.
In our analysis of consumer surplus we cover two goods, water and sewerage, for which
the same demand elasticity is assumed. 65 (The lack of data prevented us from decomposing the
revenue into finer categories.) The price elasticity we use is -0.259.66  The connection fee is not
treated explicitly, but this should not significantly affect the results because the coverage was
quite high: the water market was almost 100% covered, and the sewerage market, more than
80%. Continuity for the Santiago metropolitan area was not an issue: all connections had running
water for 24 hours a day. Finally, since the metering percentage has been 100%, there is no need
to distinguish metered and unmetered consumers.
As we mentioned in the text the total demand curve is assumed to be:
TQ,  = N,  (a  - bp)
Where TQ is total demand; N is total population; (a-b p) is individual demand curve; a is the
demand when marginal price is 0, andp, price of water and sewerage combined. Thus the total
demand curve shifts outward with the expansion of population, while the individual demand
curve remains stable over time.
The estimation of a and b involves a few assumptions.  First, the demand elasticity
around the observed demand point in 1988 is, as mentioned in the text, -0.26.  Second, except for
the population shifter for each year, the demand curve remains the same, whether under the
factual or the counterfactual. Third, at the price in 1988, the total demand consisted of all the
residents of EMOS; the uncovered population is treated as excess demand. Given the relative
low price of water and sewerage that year (roughly 0.14 US dollar), this assumption is likely
65  From total revenue and quantity of water and sewerage respectively--which are consistently available--we derive
their implicit prices.
5  This elasticity comes from two sources. The first is a study about water demand in Santiago (CITE), according to
which the price elasticity is -0.516 for households which consume 1-20 m 3 of water, -0.2 for 20-30 m 3, and -0.25 for
more than 30 m 3. The second source is the consumption pattems among households, which suggests that there were
5% of households using 1-10 m 3 per month, 40% using 10-30 m3 per month, and 55% using more than 30 m 3 per
month. Then the weighted average elasticity is  just 0.10*(-0.516)+0.35*(-0.20)+0.55*(-0.25)=-0.259. Although we
know that the demand elasticity for water of industrial and commercial use is -0.20, we did not use this piece of
information because this category of water use accounts for only 5.8% of the total use according to EMOS Annual
Report 1990. This elasticity is quite similar to that is assumed in Argentina (-0.32).71
justified.  From these assumptions, then, one may impose the following simultaneous equation
system, with two equations and two unknowns, a and b:
Ed_  dIn TQ  =N  P
dInP  TQ
Q  = N(a - bP)
coverage
They can be solved by using the data of 1988, the last year of the pre-reform era. With the
knowledge of demand function, we can then proceed to estimate consumer surplus associated
with a price and quantity pair.
The estimation of consumer surplus then proceeds as follows.
dp  1
P s  dTQ  Nb
*  Pintercept = TQx slope + Pt,
where Pintercept is the interception of the demand curve with the P axis, and Pt is the observed
marginal price.
*  Consumer surplus = SI + S2,
where  Sl  = 0.5xQx(Pintercept -PQ), and
S2=Qx(PQ-P).
Caution
The cost-benefit analysis has its limitations. While we have tried our best to take into
account as many relevant details as possible in constructing our factual and counterfactual
scenarios, we also had to leave out many relevant ingredients. For instance, it was hard to
incorporate into the benefits of the reform the improvement of the quality of the system, even
though there was evidence that it had been improving after the reform. 67 Also ignored are the
benefits in terms of better ability to deal with a major drought.
67  The number  of pipe break  per kilometer  decreased  from above  0.50  before 1990  to 0.25 in 1996,  representing  a
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